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Nibbana, Dhamma, and Sinhala Buddhism: 
A David Little Retrospective
donald K. swearer
in addition to David Little’s significant contributions to the literature on peace and human rights, at several junctures in his distinguished academic 
and professional career he engaged topics central to Buddhist ethics. In 
this chapter I propose to superimpose a trajectory on this engagement that 
begins with his chapter on Theravada ethics in Comparative Religious Ethics: 
A New Method, which he co-authored with Sumner B. Twiss;1 his debate 
with Frank E. Reynolds in Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist 
Social Ethics;2 and his several publications on Buddhism, nationalism, and 
ethnicity in Sri Lanka.3 I shall argue that Little’s account works best when 
contextualized in terms of  Sri Lanka, and is least successful in Comparative 
Religious Ethics: A New Method. At each of  the three junctures in this 
trajectory, Weberian-like perspectives loom large: in broad terms they 
are the interdependence between belief  and behavior; and a typological 
construction of  religious systems of  thought and action.
I have chosen these three junctures in Little’s work that engage 
Buddhist ethics, in part because they mark three moments in my personal 
and academic relationship with him beginning with my review of  Comparative 
Religious Ethics in Religious Studies Review;4 the Harvard-Berkeley-Chicago 
conferences in comparative religious ethics in which we participated;5 
and the conferences that we co-led at the Center for the Study of  World 
Religions at Harvard Divinity School on Religion and Nationalism in 2005, 
and Visions of  Peace and Reconciliation in 2007.6 
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Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method
The three case studies that Little and Twiss take up in the Application 
section of  Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method—Religion and Morality 
of  the Navajo, the book of  Matthew, and Theravada Buddhism—first 
address the issue of  the relationship between moral and religious action 
guides, and then examine the structure of  the practical reasoning or the way 
in which the tradition justifies action. In the case of  Theravada Buddhism 
they argue that “properly understood, all action-guides have as their object 
nirvanic attainment.”7 Given the preeminence of  the basic religious claim, 
that is, Nibbana/Nirvana as sacred authority, the Theravada practical 
system must necessarily be a thoroughgoing religious system; and, that as 
a religious system it ultimately transcends morality follows from the fact 
that Nibbana obviates the concepts of  self  and other. All prescribed and 
proscribed acts are ultimately defined in reference to self-conquest.8 even 
though Little and Twiss find that Theravada Buddhism encourages the 
cultivation of  attitudes and acts that reflect a regard for the material welfare 
of  others and that a central role is assigned to the virtues of  sympathy and 
generosity, they contend that
there can be no doubt that the content of  the action-guides, when 
systematically analyzed, is, in the last analysis, religious in character.  
. . . All moral attitudes and acts are consistently modified by a belief  in 
a sacred authority (nirvana) that not only drastically subordinates the 
material welfare of  others in favor of  their spiritual enlightenment, 
but also, and even more importantly, disallows the ultimate reality 
of  selves and others.9 
The validational patterns—the character of  an act, rules, principles of  
validation, and considerations to persuade—of  Theravada practical 
teaching leads to a similar conclusion. The first, a qualified intrapersonal 
teleology, aims at the realization of  one’s highest happiness, that is, Nibbana, 
without directly benefiting others; the second, a qualified extrapersonal 
teleology, aims at the realization of  Nibbana for oneself  and for all sentient 
beings; and the third, a pattern of  unqualified intrapersonal teleology, 
aims at maximizing one’s happiness according to the calculus of  karmic 
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consequences. The last pattern is seen as secondary or subsidiary, while 
the first two contain the premise of  a fundamental belief  in the ultimate 
unreality of  human persons.
 The key concept in the content and structure of  Theravada practical 
teaching is the notion of  dhamma/dharma, ontologically understood 
as reducing reality, including human existence, to basic elements or 
constituents and, hence, the concept of  dhamma becomes another way 
of  perceiving the “unreality of  the concept ‘self,’ by reducing all putative 
selves to their more basic elementary constituents.”10 Thus, while there is 
a moral dimension to the Theravada action guide (value concepts, action-
guiding concepts, dispositional concepts), it is provisional and subsidiary, 
qualified by a belief  in a sacred authority, Nibbana, according to which the 
concept of  the self  and the other is dissolved. 
In addition to the Nibbanic and the Dhammic deconstruction of  
reality into elements, much is made of  the Theravada concept of  not-self  
(anatta), especially in regard to Little and Twiss’s assessment of  the tradition 
as a thoroughgoing religious system in which other-regarding concerns are 
subsidiary and provisional. Morality is by definition interrelational, that 
is, it involves relations among persons; and one of  the special conditions 
of  the legitimacy of  a moral action guide is that it is other-regarding.11 
Logically, for a religious tradition which has as one of  its cardinal teachings 
the concept of  not-self  and in which the character of  all prescribed and 
proscribed acts is ultimately deemed in reference to “self-conquest,” a moral 
action guide, as defined in Comparative Religious Ethics, will have a secondary 
place at best. Furthermore, at the vindication level of  the structure of  the 
practical teachings of  the Theravada, the “radical depersonalization of  
humanity” entailed by the analysis of  the self  into dhammic components 
re-enforces Little and Twiss’s claim: “In the ultimate sense…discussion 
of  morality is inappropriate because the notion of  morality presupposes 
persons, or at least intentions normally associated with persons, and these 
are not found in Nirvana.”12 
In brief, Little and Twiss’s description of  religion and morality 
in Theravada Buddhism utilizes a typological strategy (a transpersonal 
teleological action guide) in which the major justificatory terms—Nibbana, 
not-self, and reality/human existence as constituted by evanescent dhammic 
particulars—at the very least, problematize an ethic of  other-regard. 
07swearer.indd   140 11/26/2014   6:18:35 PM
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316106693.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Library, on 22 Feb 2018 at 19:24:40, subject to the Cambridge
Swearer: Nibbana, Dhamma, and Sinhala Buddhism 141
It is perhaps an understatement to say that Comparative Religious Ethics 
raised a storm of  controversy, especially among historians of  religion who 
argued that the formal model of  appellate reasoning which informed the 
interpretation of  Theravada ethics sacrificed the complexity and historical 
realities of  the Theravada tradition to a logical reductionism determined 
primarily by Nibbana as the overriding “sacred authority.” Little recalls a 
contentious incident that took place at the Harvard comparative religious 
ethics discussions when the late Wilfred Cantwell Smith, then director 
of  the Center of  the Study of  World Religions, “delivered a furious 
denunciation of  the approach [Twiss] and I took . . . [and argued] that 
the book represented an enormous setback in the comparative study of  
religious ethics, bringing to it unwelcome Western analytical techniques 
whose only effect is to distort severely the materials under consideration.”13 
Little himself  has reevaluated the Little/Twiss approach to Comparative 
Religious Ethics and, “had I [to] do it over again,” he observes, I “would 
approach the subject quite differently.”14
Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: 
A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics
The lively debate sparked by Comparative Religious Ethics in the formative 
days of  the development of  the field of  comparative religious ethics, was a 
measure of  its significance, especially around issues of  theory and history. 
At the time, Buddhologists cum historians of  religion, especially Frank E. 
Reynolds, took aim at two major monographs in the field of  comparative 
religious ethics published in 1978: Comparative Religious Ethics: A New 
Method and Ronald m. green’s Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis 
of  Religious.15 Reynolds opined that when historians of  religion take up the 
task of  comparative religious ethics they place the study of  ethics of  a 
religious tradition within the context of  a holistic understanding of  that 
tradition including a diversity of  texts and ritual practices, and that they 
“do not become so enmeshed in abstract theoretical discussions that they 
are distracted from their empirical research.”16 
In his essay in the conference volume, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A 
Study of  Buddhist Social Ethics, Reynolds proposes a multivalent interpretation 
of  dhamma that challenges Nibbana as the foundational “sacred authority” 
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for religion and morality in Theravada Buddhism. Furthermore, Reynolds 
critiques Little’s singular interpretation of  the concept of  dhamma as the 
constitutive elements of  reality and human existence that, in conjunction 
with the concept of  not-self, undermine an ethic of  other-regard. Reynolds 
contends that dhamma, broadly conceived, is a complex and dynamic reality 
and, as such, stands as the Theravadin religio-ethical center of  gravity and 
normative truth that establishes guidelines for all forms of  action. Dhammic 
norms do, indeed, have soteriological significance in that they express and 
cultivate non-attachment, however, at the same time adherence to dhammic 
norms is conducive to the production of  goods such as wealth and the 
general well-being of  individuals and communities. Although dhammic 
norms are the basis of  the monastic code of  discipline (vinaya), they are 
equally the foundation of  lay ethics. Adherence to dhammic norms by rulers 
is of  particular importance for the well-being of  the entire community. 
Righteous kings (dhammraja) ensure peace, prosperity, and justice in their 
realms by embodying a set of  ten virtues, the dasarajadharma—generosity, 
high moral character, self-sacrifice, integrity, gentleness, non-indulgence, 
non-anger, non-oppression, tolerance—and adherence to the dhamma is 
understood in this instance as a universal moral law. “In addition to the 
dhammic activities of  kings,” observes Reynolds, “the dhammic actions 
of  other laymen and laywomen are recognized as contributing to social 
harmony, to a supportive natural environment, and to the economic 
prosperity that is associated with a properly ordered natural and social 
world.”17
Little offers three responses to Reynolds. First, Little defends 
his typological construction of  Theravada religion and morality as 
fundamentally teleological, dominated by the concept of  Nibbana. 
Although Little admits that Reynold’s shift from Nibbana to the category 
of  dhamma as the over-arching concept informing Theravada religion and 
morality “suggests a need for some modification and further elaboration 
and clarification of  the Little-Twiss interpretation,”18 he insists that it 
does not contradict that interpretation. Although strictly speaking I would 
agree, Little’s characterization of  Theravada as a system “according to 
which dhammic activity, if  properly performed leads ultimately to the 
highest goal of  Nibbana and its achievement signifies the condition of  
complete non-attachment” does not take sufficient account of  Reynolds’s 
expansive, multiplex interpretation of  dhamma. Reynolds intends his shift 
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from Nibbana to dhamma as Theravada’s sacred authority to be not merely 
an “extension” of  the concept of  “sacred authority,” as Little opines, but 
as a substantive “revision.”19
Second, Little challenges historians of  religion like Reynolds to translate 
their tradition-embedded description into ethical categories amenable to 
cross-cultural comparison such as the structure of  practical justification 
advocated in Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method. He proposes that 
an “ethical translation” of  historians’ “data” into “conventional categories 
for the study of  practical reasoning,” makes Theravada reflections on issues 
such as wealth and poverty more adaptive to cross-cultural comparison and 
difference; for example, contrasting understandings of  distributive justice, 
or contrasts between the Theravadin and Puritan economic ethic.20 little’s 
point is perennially relevant, and both provocative and problematic when 
it comes to comparative work as Jeffrey Stout brilliantly pointed out in his 
critical review of  Comparative Religious Ethics.21 
Third, Little agrees with Reynolds’s challenge to ethicists to broaden 
their scope of  investigation to include non-normative texts and doctrines, 
but, in his consistently gentlemanly manner, he contends that Reynolds’s 
“holism” really does not live up to its billing. He critiques holism for its high 
level of  generality and lack of  historical, contextual, and empirical detail 
that the informed historian of  religion might bring to the enterprise of  
comparative religious ethics. Although Little’s teleological-Nibbanic driven 
model overrides Reynolds’s more complex and nuanced interpretation 
of  dhamma, his critique of  historians of  religions’ holism for being 
insufficiently historical is well taken and has served to advance the on-
going comparative religious ethics debates between ethicists and historians 
of  religion. Furthermore, in his work on Sri Lanka, Little moves beyond 
his Nibbanic preoccupations to become more empirical, contextual, and 
historical.
Theravada Buddhism and Sri Lanka
In his more recent work on Sri Lanka, one of  the countries included in the 
U.S. Institute of  Peace Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance project, Little 
moves from the meta-ethical project represented by Comparative Religious 
Ethics: A New Method, and his subsequent dhammic dialogue with history 
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of  religion “holism,” to a specific historical context in which Buddhism 
has played a significant role in the discourse and practice of  chauvinistic 
Sinhala nationalism. In his Sri Lanka: The Invention of  Enmity and related 
essays, Weberian interests are also evident, but now woven into a more 
historically and contextually complex tapestry.22 Reflecting Weber’s view 
regarding the close entanglement of  religion and ethnicity, Little challenges 
assessments of  the Sinhala-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka that focus primarily 
on nationalism, or privilege ethnicity to the near exclusion of  religion. He 
points out that ethnic groups elevate their status above their neighbors by 
invoking a sacred warrant; hence, “religious shaded ethnic tensions appear 
to be latent in the very process of  ethnic classification.”23 In support of  his 
view, Little quotes the Sri Lankan historian, K. M. deSilva: “In the Sinhala 
language, the words for nation, race and people are practically synonymous, 
and a multiethnic or multicommunal nation or state is incomprehensible 
to the popular mind. The emphasis on Sri Lanka as the land of  the Sinhala 
Buddhists carried an emotional popular appeal, compared with which the 
concept of  a multiethnic polity was a meaningless abstraction.”24 
In the construction of  the Buddhist warrant for an ideology of  Sinhala 
nationalism, Little points to the legitimating power of  the authoritative 
Sinhala Buddhist chronicle, the Mahavamsa, and its valorization of  King 
Duttagamaani’s defeat of  the Tamils, the rise of  Sinhala nationalistic 
sentiment in response to British colonialism, and ever increasing anti-Tamil 
attitudes and policies after the 1956 election of  S. W. R. D. Bandaranike 
culminating in the internecine armed conflict that began in 1983. Little 
concludes, “[t]here can be little doubt that religious belief  has, for several 
reasons, functioned in an important way as a warrant for intolerance so far 
as the Sinhala Buddhists are concerned. There is also evidence, though it 
is more controversial and perhaps less pronounced, that the same is true 
for Tamils.”25
Little sees religion as being one of  the factors, along with ethnicity, 
language, cultural habits, and historical dynamics contributing to one group 
declaring superiority and preeminence over another. He notes that social 
scientists tend to claim “that nationalist conflicts are either not about 
ethnicity and religion at all, but rather about economic and political matters, 
or that they are at bottom more about ethnic than religious issues.”26 in 
the case of  Sri Lanka, however, “it was the religious factor—the sacred 
legends synthesized by Buddhist monks into the Mahavamsa and the other 
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chronicles—that gave special authority to the Sinhala as a ‘chosen people’ 
and thereby entitled them . . . to preserve and protect the preeminence of  
the Sinhala Buddhist tradition in Sri Lankan life.”27
In “Belief, Ethnicity, and Nationalism,” Little frames the Sri Lanka 
case typologically in terms of  two types of  modern nationalism: liberal and 
illiberal, civic versus ethnic, non-aggressive versus aggressive. Citing Weber’s 
characterization of  nationalism as, at bottom, both a homogenizing and a 
differentiation mode of  discourse that drives toward cultural standardization, 
Sri Lanka exemplifies illiberal, ethnic, aggressive nationalism sanctified by 
the Buddhist sangha (monastic order). Little is not claiming that Buddhist 
belief, as such, legitimates a virulent, chauvinistic Sinhala nationalism. 
Indeed, as he points out, the basic tenets and doctrines of  Buddhism would 
not seem to support ethnic favoritism. Such attitudes, rather, resulted from 
a combination of  historical pressures on the Theravada sangha in the fifth 
and sixth centuries CE, and colonial and post-colonial experiences in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including attitudes of  racism and 
anti-Buddhist intolerance fostered by Christian missionaries and British 
colonial authorities.
In conclusion I choose to highlight one of  several issues that 
Little’s engagement with Theravada Buddhist ethics raises within the 
on-going debates in the field of  comparative religious ethics, namely, the 
relationship—might we say the dialectical relationship—between theory 
and history broadly construed. Comparative Religious Ethics was criticized for 
being overly theoretical and insufficiently historical. Stout, for example, 
observed, “What would a more genuinely historical approach to religion 
and morality look like? Probably rather like some of  the work Little and 
Twiss find lacking in rigor. What seems like insufficient dedication to rigor 
on the part of  historians may well be an altogether healthy willingness 
to make contact with all the messy details of  historical change.”28 little 
acknowledges that he would now approach Theravada ethics quite 
differently than he did in Comparative Religious Ethics. Putting the shoe on the 
other foot, he criticizes historians of  religion for their generalized holism 
which, he argues, is insufficiently historical. In contrast, Little’s work on 
Buddhism and nationalism in Sri Lanka is quite attentive to historical detail 
within the dual typology of  liberal and illiberal nationalism: “We must be 
as attentive to the conditioning effects of  politics, economics, historical 
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accidents and so on, on religion and culture, as we are to the contribution 
of  religion and culture to the formation of  nationalism.”29
Finally, of  the Weberian perspectives that inform the examples of  
Little’s work I have cited in this brief  chapter, a Nibbanized Theravada 
that limits an ethic of  other-regard, and a politicized Theravada that 
warrants ethnic nationalism—it is the latter that engages the “complexity 
and historical realities of  the Theravada tradition” and in doing so might 
be seen as Little’s answer to his critique of  holism for not taking sufficient 
account of  changing social, political, and historical contexts.30
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